give behavioral insight into the causes of capacity reduction. In the Netherlands, the location and time of an incident are stored, as well as the loop detector data. From loop detector data, one could derive some properties of the flows around accidents, but these data will not give detailed information about the behavior of the drivers. Ossen et al. (6) describe what happens to (unaggregated) counts at a loop detector near an incident location. Moreover, it is usually not possible to measure at the exact location of the accident. This paper describes the unique microscopic data collection method using a helicopter. These observations made it possible to analyze real-life behavior of road users passing the location of an incident. The data can also be used for fitting car-following models to the collected trajectory data (7, 8) .
Incidents on freeways cause large delays for road users. These delays depend largely on the capacity at the incident location, which is determined by the drivers' behavior at the accident location. Few empirical facts are available on traffic operations during an incident. This paper presents high-quality videos of the traffic flow around two accidents recorded from a helicopter. From the collected images, traffic counts have been performed at the exact location of the incident. This has two advantages. First, the capacity at the bottleneck per lane could be estimated. Second, truck counts could be converted to passenger car units at the location of the bottleneck. Counts show that the (outflow) capacity of the remaining lanes is about 50% lower than the (free-flow) capacity of the same number of lanes. This means that the road capacity in the opposite direction is reduced by half by the rubbernecking effect. The capacity of the road in the direction of the accident is reduced by more than half because not all lanes are in use. The images provide information on the causes for the capacity reduction. A leader accelerates and the follower accelerates a short time later. The average time between these two accelerations is estimated at about 3 s, but the video also shows a large spread of these times. The results can be used to assess consequences of incidents, in an analytical way and in macroscopic or microscopic traffic simulators.
A significant part of road-user delays are caused by incidents (1, 2) . The incident reduces the road capacity. Ultimately, together with the demand and route choice, the road capacity determines the delays. For a good description of the road users' actions, it is necessary to have detailed measurements of their behavior. Estimates for the capacity reduction are given for instance in the Highway Capacity Manual (3). Qin and Smith (4) carry out a more detailed analysis, still based on macroscopic data. In microsimulation packages the driving performance of individual vehicles is modeled; hence the capacity is an output of the model. For instance, Sinha et al. (5) use several of these software tools to calculate the capacity with a partial road blocking. To the best of the authors' knowledge, detailed, microscopic measurements to calibrate and validate the models have not been collected nor presented until now.
Capacity is reduced by the blocking of lanes. Moreover, the driving behavior in the remaining lanes can differ from the usual behavior. The available aggregated cross-section (inductive loop) data do not incident and at the incident location itself. This allows, for instance, the observation of speed adaptation, car-following behavior (including estimation of the reaction times), and lane choice behavior (13) . For the capacity estimation, just the passing times are needed. Nevertheless, data from one loop detector will not be sufficient because generally the detector is not located exactly at the place of the accident. Furthermore, one needs to know whether there is a queue waiting. It is also necessary to distinguish between trucks and cars at the moment of passing the accident (and not at another location farther down the road). If data from a detector located farther down the road are taken, the different traffic classes (trucks and cars) are probably already mixed because of a difference in speed: trucks accelerate and drive slower than passenger cars. For one interval, the traffic composition at a detector more downstream is therefore not the same as the traffic composition at the bottleneck. To show the differences, the result of a detector count is also presented in the section on data analysis.
Data Collection Using Remote Sensing
The following approach was taken to obtain the data on an accident. A digital photo camera was attached to a helicopter. The helicopter stayed at approximately the same position, above the accident. The camera could move in all directions to compensate for the helicopter movements. Digital photographs were taken at a rate of 15.1 images per second and saved to a hard drive. The size of the pictures is 1,392 × 1,040 pixels. The height of the helicopter was about 400 m (about 1,300 ft) and the length of the long size of the image is also about 400 m (440 yd). Therefore, this implies that one pixel equals about 30 × 30 cm (12 × 12 in.) on the road. The procedure is also described by Hoogendoorn et al. (14) .
The observation team waited at the Traffic Management Center in the center of the Netherlands until an accident had occurred somewhere nearby, after which it flew with the helicopter to the accident location. From the moment of arrival, traffic operations for both directions were recorded. From the other side of the road, the incident was visible but there was no physical obstruction. The video therefore shows the so-called rubbernecking effect (i.e., people watching the accident on the other side of the guardrail). The helicopter was high enough not to influence the traffic operations.
The rest of the paper presents the data for two accidents. At the first accident, a light van rolled over. It ended in the median strip, the unpaved area between the two carriageways of the freeway. The accident occurred on June 6, 2007, at about 9:15 a.m., near Apeldoorn on Motorway A1 in the Netherlands (see also Figure 1 ). The road has two carriageways in each direction and no grade. For the eastbound direction, one lane was used by the emergency vehicles and therefore blocked for the traffic. For the other, westbound, direction, the delay was caused only by rubbernecking. Unfortunately, about 100 m (110 yd) west of the blocking of the lane, there was a tunnel; hence the traffic operations there are not visible (see Figure 2) . The crosses mark the blocked lanes, the arrows the available lanes.
The other accident involved several trucks and passenger cars. junction Gorinchem (see Figure 3) ; there is no grade. Traffic had to merge twice in several hundreds of meters. At the merging lane traffic from the two freeways had to merge into the mainstream. Just after the merging lane, all traffic had to merge from two lanes to one lane. The traffic demand in the eastbound direction was not sufficiently high to cause a traffic jam. The main interest lies in the causes for the delay caused by incidents. Although traffic operations might change, there will be no substantial delay without a traffic jam. Hence, the traffic operations at the accident location near Gorinchem, Netherlands, in the uncongested eastbound direction were not analyzed. Table 1 summarizes all properties. The recording was stopped when the road was clear or when there was no longer a queue waiting.
DATA ANALYSIS
From the image sequence, the passing times of the vehicles at the incident were recorded. In doing so, a distinction was made between the different lanes and two different vehicle types: heavy vehicles and light vehicles. It is possible that there are small errors in the passing times of the vehicles, which might (in some cases) cause a vehicle to be counted in the wrong time interval. That would have no effect on the median flow because the extra vehicle in one time interval would be compensated for in the other.
From these passing times, flows were computed, aggregating over time and over the carriageway. For the sections that have a queue of waiting vehicles behind them, this flow represents the outflow capac-ity. This outflow capacity differs from the free-flow capacity. The free-flow capacity is the maximum number of vehicles per unit of time that can pass a cross section of a road in free flow. This free-flow capacity is usually obtained before congestion sets in. The number of cars that flow out of a queue per unit of time is usually lower. This phenomenon is called the capacity drop. It is described extensively in the literature; estimations for the reduction vary, but typically are about 10% (9) (10) (11) .
Both the free-flow capacity and the outflow capacity are stochastic variables (15) . Their value depends on external conditions (such as weather and road geometry) and individual characteristics of the drivers. Usually, they are characterized by their median values: the maximum flow value that is obtained in half of the cases. For one measurement, the external conditions are fixed. An interesting property of the capacity is its variability. It gives an indication of the extent of the interdriver differences and the reliability of traffic flow operations. Not all aggregation intervals can be used for outflow capacity estimation. There should be a queue of cars waiting to pass, and the flow should be uninterrupted (not always the case at the accident location near Gorinchem). If there is no constant queue outflow capacity, that aggregation interval should be ignored in the capacity estimation. The amount of data that should be ignored increases with the aggregation time. A relatively short aggregation time of 30 s was taken.
The short periods gave a large number of measurements. This made it possible to obtain a distribution of the capacity. The flows are sensitive to the (mis) count of one vehicle because only a few vehicles pass in a period, so the consequences of missing one vehicle are great. However, there is no bias. Consider an example with a constant flow rate. Suppose that a vehicle passes the detector just at the start of Aggregation Interval A and that a vehicle passes at the very end of that interval. The next interval, B, now starts with a gap. The flow value of Interval A is higher than the average flow rate, whereas in Interval B the flow rate is lower. However, there will be no bias for the median value: the vehicle passing in Interval A is subtracted from the value in Interval B. By taking the median value, the sensitivity for a single value is reduced. Taking short intervals increases the variability. This is the effect of the increased impact of (mis) counts and the higher variability in the drivers' population between aggregation intervals.
Using the 30-s intervals, there are about 35-40 aggregation intervals for the location near Apeldoorn (the number of usable intervals depends on the lane and direction) and 45 for the location near Gorinchem. To determine a single value for the flow, all passing vehicles were converted to passenger car equivalents. Hence, the passing of a truck is counted as 1.5 passenger cars (3, 16) . The flows were converted in this way to passenger car units per lane (pcu/lane).
This results in five different outflow capacity estimates:
• Apeldoorn eastbound-carriageway, The first value is for the amount of traffic that passes the accident near Apeldoorn, the eastbound direction. The lanes used change over time: sometimes the emergency lane is used, sometimes the right lane is used, and sometimes they are both used. From the video it is observed that some drivers choose to avoid a specific lane without an apparent reason. Both lanes are available for the drivers. Taking the flow values of each of the lanes separately would yield nonsensical results (often no one uses the lane, although there is a queue waiting). The focus is on the capacity, which is a result of the drivers' behavior. Adding the flows of the emergency and the right lane gives information about the realized queue outflow capacity if these two lanes are available. In this way, a capacity value for each lane is not obtained. However, the value obtained for the roadway is a result of drivers' behavior passing the accident location. The resulting flow values are divided by 2 to obtain an outflow capacity per lane.
Traffic in the opposing direction uses both lanes continuously. A capacity value for each of the two lanes, as well as the average outflow capacity (distribution) per lane, can therefore be computed. The fifth capacity value is the capacity of the remaining lane passing the incident at the accident location near Gorinchem.
CAPACITY ESTIMATION RESULTS
For Incident 1, congestion occurs in both directions. The heads of both queues appear to be at the location of the accident. That is, the accident is an active bottleneck. In Figure 4 the distributions for the capacities (in pcu/h) have been plotted.
The steps in the capacity distribution of the left lane are explained by the aggregation interval. Because there are no trucks in this lane, the flow values of one aggregation interval are an integer times 1 pcu. One passenger car unit per 30 s converted to an hourly value gives steps of (1 pcu/s * 3,600 s/h =) 120 pcu/h, which are the steps that are seen in Figure 4c .
In Figure 4f , the flow distribution on a more downstream detector for the westbound direction of the Gorinchem accident site is plotted. There are more intervals with no cars passing. In the data collected from the helicopter, the periods in which the road is completely blocked are discarded; such is impossible if one has only detector data. Furthermore, these are counts made without distinction between trucks and passenger cars; consequently the flow is given in vehicles per hour and not in passenger car units per hour. In the Netherlands, the detectors give reliable data for the counts, but not for the different car classes. If one were able to distinguish between trucks and cars, the traffic would be mixed after a distance. Consider, for instance, passenger cars overtaking trucks that were in front of them. This clusters car counts at one moment (the moment of overtaking); the number of cars in another position (e.g., in front of the truck) could be lower. The median will remain the same, but an increase in spread of flow is the result of counts at a more downstream detector. range of the values: all values except the crossed outliers lie within these two whiskers. Under normal conditions, in the Netherlands a two-lane motorway is assumed to have a median free capacity of 4,650 pcu/h (16) . In addition to Figure 5 , the (outflow) capacities of the accident locations are stated in Table 2 . The values are converted to passenger car units per hour per lane. A capacity value is computed based on the remaining lanes. As one could expect based on a change in drivers' attention, the traffic flow at accident sites is lower than this capacity value ( Table 2 ). The stated expected capacity is the reference free-flow capacity (16) for the number of lanes that are open.
For example, in the case of Gorinchem the reference capacity was already taken for one lane. Thus, the near 50% reduction of capacity cannot be explained by the reduction in the number of lanes. The general view, for all locations, is that because of rubbernecking, the average queue discharge rate at the location of the incident is about half the free-flow capacity. This reduction is much larger than the differences normally quoted between free-flow capacity and outflow capacity.
In the first case, Apeldoorn eastbound, one of the two remaining lanes is the emergency lane. This has two consequences for the estimation of the capacity reduction. First, the reference capacity is probably lower than the capacity for two full-width lanes. Second, as described in the section on data analysis, the use of both lanes at this location varies in time: sometimes the shoulder lane is used, sometimes the right lane is used, and sometimes both of them are used. If both lanes were being used continuously, the flow would probably have been higher. However, the data represent the drivers' behavior around the accident, including their lane choice. Thus, the net effect is that the resulting outflow capacity is 50% lower than the free-flow capacity would have been for a two-lane road.
This reduction can be caused by rubbernecking, the fact that people are distracted by watching what has happened. Another possibility is that people drive extra carefully because there are people working on the roadway. Other publications show lower reductions (4, 17 ) expressed as a percentage of the road capacity. The confidence bounds for the values in the references are unclear, and thus it is impossible to tell whether the difference is significant. A possible explanation for a larger reduction found in this study is the high free flow in the Netherlands. A similar congestion flow would then lead to a higher capacity reduction.
It is remarkable that the resulting maximum flow rates at the accident near Apeldoorn are about the same for the eastbound and the westbound direction, whereas in the eastbound direction one lane is blocked. Drivers will use the emergency lane from time to time. Blocking of a lane and looking at the accident cause the same reduction of flow as the rubbernecking from the opposite direction.
QUEUE ESCAPE TIMES
The capacities found are very low, much lower than expected. This section will explain the low capacities. It will connect the low capacities to queue escape times and provide an insight into the distribution.
An explanation of the rubbernecking effect can be found by a detailed observation of the collected video images. For both incidents, one position at which the head of the queue is located can be pinpointed. The locations are marked with an arrow in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . From that point on, people accelerate and the traffic jam dissipates. It is believed that this is the point at which the drivers have the best view of the accident. The response to the acceleration of the leader is sometimes very slow, up to several seconds. This time is the queue escape time, T q . This time is larger than the reaction time: drivers are probably physically able to respond faster, but because of the incident, they do not react as fast as they could. If there was a traffic jam that dissipated, the head of the queue would move backward, because T q is usually shorter than the gross headway, h, in the traffic jam. Here, the head of the queue moved backward and then came back to the same place. This leads to the conclusion that, on average, the queue escape time equals the average gross time headway, h. The gross average time headway can be derived from the flows:
In this equation, h is the gross headway and q is the flow and the brackets indicate the median operator. Table 3 gives this headway, or time delay. The unit for flow is pcu/h/lane; the corresponding unit for headway is lane.h/pcu. In Table 3 , the units are converted to lane.s/pcu.
All the values are computed from Table 2 . The average time headway for the free-flow situation is shown in the last two lines of Table 3 . For the free-flow situation, this is not a queue escape time (there is no queue). The capacity drop (stated previously) will increase the average headway by about 10%. In the case of a backward-moving
head of the queue, the time delay to accelerate between the leader and follower will be shorter than the headway. The average time between the acceleration of the follower and the leader is roughly two times larger than the average headway time for following at capacity in the Netherlands. Hoogendoorn and Bovy (18) show a distribution of headways in the Netherlands for a nonincident location. The times presented here are converted times from the flows in passenger car units. That should already correct for the higher number of trucks. That the headway in the fast lane is smaller should be attributed to the faster response of the drivers and not to the lower percentage of trucks in the left lane.
The video shows a large spread of the time that people take to look at the accident location before accelerating. Platoons of passenger cars in the left lane accelerate normally out of the jam, in which case the head of the queue temporarily moves upstream. But then there is one driver that keeps driving slowly until reaching the incident site. It is concluded that these drivers are the main cause of the very large average queue escape times at the location of the incident and hence for the low capacity.
Also in the left lane, some cars take a long time before accelerating. It is observed that the average platoon length in the left lane is longer than in the right lane. This means that the flow is higher because the number of cars per platoon is higher, and thus the average headway is lower.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The two-directional traffic passing two different accident locations on freeways was measured. From the video data the traffic flows at the location of the incident were determined. Because both incidents considered resulted in congestion, one in two directions and the other in one direction, the queue discharge rate for the partially blocked roads, as well as the magnitude of the rubbernecking effect, could be estimated.
The location of the active bottleneck has been pinpointed at the location at which there is a clear sight line to the accident. The maximum outflow out of the jam has been estimated and is found to be roughly 50% lower than the flow that could be obtained on the same number of lanes without an incident. There are two behavioral reasons for this effect. People could take the time to watch the accident (rubbernecking) or, alternatively, they could drive with extra care (i.e., slower) to respect the workers. It was pointed out that the time headway equals the queue escape time. This time is, on average, about 3 s at the incident location. A normal average headway is about 1.6 s in the Netherlands. The video shows a large spread in the time drivers need to accelerate before their leaders do. These results can be used in the analysis of delays caused by incidents and accidents. The traffic behavior of road users is an input for analytical planning models and microscopic and macroscopic simulation models. In most analyses, the capacity is now reduced only in the direction of the incident. This research shows that the effects in the opposing direction could be of the same order.
In this contribution, the collected video data were used to estimate capacity at the location of the accidents. Some qualitative findings about the reasons for the observed low queue discharge rates have been presented. There are tools to change the video into trajectory data. When converted, the data set provides an excellent basis to calibrate car-following models (14) . With these calibrated models, the drivers' behavior can be described more closely, including the intradriver and interdriver variability in car-following behavior. A more extensive study, including more incidents, will show the differences in capacity reductions for various incidents and indicate the effects of incident management measures such as screening the incident location using non-see-through screens.
